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Abstract—In an emerging trend, more and more Internet users
search for information from Community Question and Answer
(CQA) websites, as interactive communication in such websites
provides users with a rare feeling of trust. More often than
not, end users look for instant help when they browse the
CQA websites for the best answers. Hence, it is imperative that
they should be warned of any potential commercial campaigns
hidden behind the answers. Existing research focuses more on the
quality of answers and does not meet the above need. Textual
similarities between questions and answers are widely used in
previous research. However, this feature will no longer be effective
when facing commercial paid posters. More context information,
such as writing templates and a user’s reputation track need
to be combined together to form a new model to detect the
potential campaign answers. In this paper, we develop a system
that automatically analyzes the hidden patterns of commercial
spam and raises alarms instantaneously to end users whenever
a potential commercial campaign is detected. Our detection
method integrates semantic analysis and posters’ track records
and utilizes the special features of CQA websites largely different
from those in other types of forums such as microblogs or news
reports. Our system is adaptive and accommodates new evidence
uncovered by the detection algorithms over time. Validated with
real-world trace data from a popular Chinese CQA website over a
period of three months, our system shows great potential towards
adaptive online detection of CQA spams.
I. INTRODUCTION
Web 2.0 social websites are playing an increasingly impor-
tant role on the Internet by utilizing the wisdom of crowds.
One such example is the Community Question and Answer
(CQA) portals on which users can post and answer questions,
such as Yahoo! Answers, Naver and Baidu Zhidao [1], [2],
[3]. Some CQA websites like Quora [4] attract users by
offering professional answers, most of which come from
verified people in reality. These websites gain popularity and
trust by providing a sense of interaction between the questioner
and the masses. With millions of archived Q&A sessions,
CQA forums have become a major source of advice for many
Internet users.
As a large knowledge base of crowds, the archived Q&A
sessions have been used for automatic question answering and
recommendation. Nevertheless, the quality of user-generated
content in the Q&A sessions varies drastically. For instance,
some answers do not match the questions and even contain
spam and rude words. In recent years, tremendous efforts have
been made to locate better answers and remove spam from the
archived questions and answers resource. Techniques such as
analysis of text, user-question-answer’s link relationship, and
user feedback features have been used in tools like PageRank
to identify high-quality web pages [5], [6], [7].
Existing techniques, however, may not work well in the
presence of the so-called Internet water army, a large crowd
of hidden posters who get paid to generate artificial content
in the social media for commercial profits. Paid posters
have become popular with the booming of crowd-sourcing
marketing. As confirmed in [8], crowd-sourcing systems such
as Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, Zhu Ba Jie (a similar Chinese
crowd-sourcing site), have been broadly used for commercial
campaigns. Due to their popularity, the CQA forums have
become the targets of those campaigns that create untruthful
Q&A sessions for commercial purpose. Consider the following
example:
Question: I tried several methods to lose weight but all
failed. What should I do? Please give me some advice!
Best answer: Don’t worry, I have experienced the same pain
as you. Firstly, you have to keep a healthy diet. Be careful
about the nutrition in your food and never eat fast food.
Secondly, don’t sit too long in front of a computer. Finally,
perform physical exercise everyday. What’s more, you can also
try a product named X. This product cotains ingredients such
as ... and can help you lose weight without any risks.
The above Q&A session was actually generated by paid
posters. The answer provides very practical advice at first
and then gives suggestion on the product which needs to be
promoted. The practical advice part is to earn the trust of
the users. We have observed that fake answers generated by
paid posters are often long enough and quite relevant to the
questions, and some paid posters involved in the fake Q&A
sessions are ranked high according to the website’s reputation
system.
Based on textual similarities, previous work [9], [10], [11]
is likely to treat the above answer as of high quality due to
the high relevance of textual features between the answer and
question content. As a result, the output may contain com-
mercial spam, resulting in a credibility problem. Therefore,
additional strategies, such as writing templates, public calls
for commercial campaigns, and a poster’s track reputation,
should be integrated for the effective detection of paid posters.
Furthermore, most existing work relies on offline analysis,
ar
X
iv
:1
20
8.
14
48
v2
  [
cs
.IR
]  
5 J
an
 20
13
2while end users demand for instant help and should be warned
of potential commercial campaigns when they browse a CQA
forum. The call for a real-time response system that can detect
potentially fake Q&A sessions on the fly is strong.
We tackle the above two challenges in this paper by design-
ing an adaptive online detection system tailored specifically for
CQA forums. Our contributions are as follows:
• We discover that the behavioral features of paid posters
are different in CQA forums when compared to other
types of forums such as microblog (also called Weibo,
a Twitter like service in China) and news reports. We
identify the special features of paid posters in CQA
forums that are useful in the detection.
• Based on the identified special features, we design a de-
tection method which uses machine-learning techniques
and assigns credibility scores to each of the best answers
by using semantic analysis and user features, such as
users’ history data.
• We implement an adaptive, online detection system which
automatically analyzes the hidden patterns of commercial
spams and raises alarms instantaneously to end users
whenever a potential commercial campaign is detected.
Our system is adaptive and accommodates new evidence
gathered by the detection algorithms over time.
II. DATA COLLECTION AND LABELING
A. Data Collection
Since the readers tend to pay more attention to the best
answers and also due to the manner in which online paid
posters are supposed to work, we only collected the best
answers and ignored other ones. This is to avoid collecting
a large amount of irrelevant information for this study.
In order to collect campaign Q&A sessions, we first visited
the crowd-sourcing websites, where the paid posters apply for
campaign tasks and get paid, as stated in Section I. From
the campaigns calling for paid posters, we selected 11 closed
requests because the paid posters who worked for the 11
products had finished the tasks. We extracted keywords for
the 11 products and searched for Q&A sessions with them on
Baidu Zhidao. We used a crawler to visit and download the
web pages associated with searching result. These sessions
included not only the campaign sessions, but also normal ses-
sions containing the keywords. After parsing all the collected
web pages, we obtained a group of target users, including both
paid posters and normal users, as well as the links to the users’
homepages hosted by Baidu Zhidao.
By following the users’ homepages, we could find useful
information for our research. For example, a user’s homepage
provides the Q&A sessions where this user posted his/her an-
swers (the question answering records). The question-answer
history provides a good knowledge on the multiple campaigns
that a potential paid poster might have been involved. Having
obtained the initial dataset of IDs and links, we then visited
each user’s homepage, retrieved every Q&A session that
the user participated in. We only collected the closed Q&A
sessions (i.e., the best answer determined). A closed Q&A
session implies that users can no longer post new answers
to the question, but they can click the “Like” button to
support the posted answers, including the best answer and
other answers. From those Q&A sessions, we finally extracted
information used in our analysis. The recorded information
from those web pages includes questioner ID, answer ID, time,
title, question content, answer content, user feedbacks (visited
times, ratings).
From the Q&A website, Baidu Zhidao, we crawled, 6462
users’ question-answer history records accumulated during a
three-month period from October to December in 2011. For
each user, we built a list of history information, showing the
question, answer, participated user IDs, and other features.
Associated with the 6462 user IDs, we have 75, 200 Q&A
sessions in total, all having the best answer.
B. Manual Data Labeling
To get a sample dataset for feature analysis, campaign
sessions should be differentiated from the normal ones. By
reading the best answers, we manually labeled the Q&A
sessions in the dataset. The labeling process mainly depends
on the Q&A templates from the crowd-sourcing websites such
as Zhubajie [12] and Tiancaicheng [13]. We summarize the
applied techniques below:
1) Since we have collected a list of 11 products which were
hyped in the Baidu Zhidao, we could compare the Q&A
content with the campaign templates. If the product’s
name is in the 11 initial samples and the contents match
the templates, such as the descriptive words and the or-
ganized pattern of sentences, we labeled it as a campaign
Q&A session. We stress that there is difference between
our work and related research which needs to judge the
quality of answers. The evaluation of quality of answers
is usually based on question-answer relevance, length
of the texts, grammar correctness, politeness, and so on.
To obtain a reliable dataset, researchers often rely on
multiple assessors and are faced with the difficulty of
reaching an agreement among the multiple evaluation
results. Our labeling method differs from the above and
largely avoids the annotation difficulty, because we know
exactly the name of the hyped product and how paid
posters would write the Q&A sessions.
2) When we encountered new products not in the list of
11 initial samples, we recorded the product’s name and
searched it in the crowd-sourcing websites. If we found
the template of this product, we use the above method
to compare their contents.
3) If a new product is listed in the campaign websites
but the template is not available, we followed some
special features normally found in Email spam to make a
decision. For example, a spam may use different fonts to
write the telephone numbers and insert special characters
between the product’s name. This type of operations is
usually used to escape detection by the filter system. We
labeled the session as campaign if the product’s name
3is in a campaign list and the best answer has special
features similar to Email spam.
4) If we could not find the new product in the campaign
websites, we then tried to identify potential templates
used in the same category of products and special
features obvious in an Email spam. If none of those
could be identified, we labeled the session as a normal
session.
Up to now, we have labeled 4998 samples in our dataset.
Among these, 2147 samples are campaign Q&A sessions and
the other 2851 samples are normal ones. The sample size
is large enough for our current study. Since we selected 11
campaigns, which were posted on the crowdsourcing websites,
as the seeds of our crawler, the proportion of campaign
sessions is relatively high in the dataset.
When we manually labeled our datasets, we carefully read
the contents of a user’s post. The meaning can be understood
by human but is hard to use in machine learning based
classification. Even with the above template based labeling
method, it is not easy to write an algorithm to automatically
identify a campaign session because a poster may re-phrase
the template in their own words. Due to these reasons, we
need to search for statistical features that can be effectively
used towards building a detection system.
III. ANALYSIS OF STATISTICAL FEATURES
A. Insufficiency of Existing Statistical Features
We firstly demonstrate the difficulty of the problem we
study by analyzing existing features, some of which have been
used in related research such as evaluation of high quality
answers or detection of Internet water army in news report
websites [14] and showing their limitations.
1) Interval Post Time: In [15], Arjun et al. defined several
spamming indicators for modelling the behaviour of fake
review writers. They found that spammers of a spam group
tend to post reviews during a short time interval. This feature
has been shown to be a good indicator to detect Internet water
army in news report websites [14].
In our work, we consider two time stamps for a Q&A
session: One is the time when the questioner post the question
topic (the ask time), and the other one is the time when the
best answer is posted by a replier (the best answer posted
time). We define interval post time as the latter time stamp
minus the former one.
In Figure 1, we show the approximated probability distribu-
tion of interval post time with dot-dashed lines for campaign
sessions and solid lines for non-campaign sessions. The x-axis
is drawn by log scale.
From the figure, we find it difficult to tell the difference
between campaign and non-campaign Q&A sessions. Two
reasons may contribute to the above phenomenon. There are
many normal users who spend much time on the Q&A website
and try to post answers to open questions, especially those
questions associated with some rewards points. These people
are known as bounty hunters. Most bounty hunters post very
good answers because they want to get more rewards points.
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Fig. 1. The PDF and CDF of the interval post time
On the other hand, online paid posters, before they post and
choose the best answer, normally wait for some random time
for other answers appearing in the session. This is to give
readers a fake impression that the best answer is selected
among many answers. While paid posters try to finish a job
as quickly as possible in news review websites [14], the same
behaviour does not exist here.
2) Number of Other Answers: Before the question is closed,
users can post their own answers. This variable counts the
number of answers other than the best one. Intuitively, if the
paid posters create the sessions themselves, they may not have
patience to wait for more replies. They could close the sessions
and get paid as soon as possible. To test this conjecture, we
show the probability distribution of this feature for campaign
sessions and normal sessions in Figure 2 .
Similar to the interval post time, the number of other
answers does not indicate much difference for the two types
of Q&A sessions. This invalidates the above conjecture and
we do not consider it a good feature for the detection of paid
posters in CQA portals.
3) Number of Likes: Similar to the “Like” button in Face-
book, if other readers find the best answer to be helpful,
they may click the “like” button. The number on the button
indicates the total number of clicks. Intuitively, this feature
represents user’s feedback and should be helpful in identifying
trustful answers. The more “likes” an answer receives, the
more likely it is a good answer. However, as shown in Figure 3,
this is not a reliable feature. This is because the paid posters
could click the button themselves and even use different user
IDs to click multiple times. This behavior is also confirmed
in [16] as the “vote spam attack”.
4) Relevance between Questions and The Best Answers:
This feature is extensively used before in identifying high-
quality answers [9], [10], [7], [11]. The previous work is
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Fig. 2. The PMF and CDF of the number of other answers
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Fig. 3. The PMF and CDF of the number of likes
usually based on following assumptions:
1) Semantically high relevance between questions and an-
swers indicates high quality.
2) Selected best answers should have higher quality than
other answers.
The above assumptions are risky for the detection of potential
campaigns created by paid posters. In commercial campaigns,
answers with high-quality are rather misleading and would
beat the retrieval mechanism. Many of the answers are well-
organized and highly related to the questions. In this sense, a
“high-quality” answer does not necessarily mean trustworthi-
ness. Thus, we do not consider the relevance measure in our
work.
B. Special Features for CQA Portals
The limitations of existing statistical features shown above
led us to look for new features specific to users in CQA
websites.
1) Spam Grade of Questioner ID (SGqID): It indicates
whether the questioner tends to ask campaign questions. For a
given questioner ID (qID), we calculate the ratio of the number
of campaign sessions and the total number of sessions in which
the user has participated,
SGqID =
q1
q0 + q1
(1)
where q0 and q1 are the number of non-campaign and cam-
paign sessions where the user appears as the questioner,
respectively. To avoid 0 probability, we specify 0.5 to q1 when
q1 = 0. If the system does not have enough information for
a certain user(i.e., the denominator is less than 5), we set its
SGqID value to 0.5. 1
2) Spam Grade of Answerer ID (SGaID): It indicates
whether the best answer poster tends to write campaign
answers. For a given answerer ID (aID), we calculate the ratio
of the number of campaign sessions and the total number of
sessions in which the user has participated,
SGaID =
a1
a0 + a1
(2)
where a0 and a1 are the number of non-campaign and cam-
paign sessions the user appears as the poster of the best
answers, respectively. Similar to SGqID, to avoid 0 probability,
we specify 0.5 to a1 when a1 = 0. If the system does not
record enough information, we set its SGaID value to 0.5.
3) Spam Grade of the Text (SGtext): It indicates whether
the collection of words in sessions associated to a user tends
to be campaign specific. To calculate this feature, we need to
perform statistical analysis over the words. Text information
of a Q&A session consists of the title, the content of question,
and the content of the best answer. We remove the duplicate
words so that we can get a collection of distinct words,
word1, word2, word3 ... wordn, for each Q&A session. For
each word, we calculate spam grade which characterizes the
property of the word, i.e., whether it is more campaign oriented
or non-campaign oriented. Words with higher benchmark are
more likely to imply hidden promotion behavior. To get rid of
the impact of different length, we take the average value over
the summation of the benchmarks of all words as the spam
grade of the whole text. For each word, the definition of spam
grade goes like this:
SGwordi = log
(
N + 1
ni + 1
)
∗ si + 1
S + 1
(3)
where N and S are the total number of non-campaign and
campaign sessions in the databases and ni and si are the
number of non-campaign and campaign sessions where the
1This decision follows the Maximum Entropy Principle [17], i.e., we should
“make use of all the information that is given and scrupulously avoid making
assumptions about information that is not available.”
5wordi appears. The term “+1” is used to normalize the result
in case of zero counts. Then the spam grade of text with L
distinct words is calculated as:
SGtext =
SGword1 + SGword2 + ...+ SGwordL
L
(4)
C. Property of the Feature Set
Figure 4 exhibits the values using the three “SG” features
in the previous section.
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Fig. 4. 4998 samples captured by SGqID, SGaID and SGtext
Through this figure, we can observe a clear gap between the
campaign sessions and non-campaign sessions. We can then
apply regression based techniques to calculate the campaign
score, which indicates whether a Q&A session tends to be a
campaign.
IV. DETECTION METHOD
In this section, we introduce a logistic regression approach
to calculate campaign scores for Q&A sessions using the three
proposed “SG” features.
A. The Algorithm
Figure 4 has already shown that the samples can be distin-
guished by the three proposed features, SGqID, SGaID and
SGtext. In order to get a score indicating whether a Q&A
session is a potential commercial campaign or not, we apply
logistic regression as the learning method. We can use it to
calculate values of P (Y = 1|X, θ) and P (Y = 0|X, θ). Here,
Y is a indicator variable, where Y = 1 and Y = 0 represent
campaign and non-campaign Q&A sessions, respectively. X
is a vector of three features for each session. θ is a vector of
model parameters, each associated with a session feature and
including an individually constant item(also called intercept
term) which is not related to the session features.
By applying the sigmoid function, the hypothesis hθ(X)
which outputs a score of P (Y = 1|X, θ) or P (Y = 0|X, θ)
(termed as campaign score) is defined as follows:
hθ(X) =
1
1 + e−θTX
(5)
where θTX = θ1+θ2∗SGqID+θ3∗SGaID+θ4∗SGtext.
To facilitate the matrix calculation, we add an all-1 column to
X .
In practice, the higher the score, the higher the probability
that the given session is a campaign session. The values of
θ will be learned by logistic regression. The objective then
becomes an regression problem where we optimize the model
so that the output campaign scores of sessions are close to
their true labels (0 or 1).
The convex cost function of this optimization problem is
given by
J(θ) =
1
m
Σmi=1[−y(i)log(hθ(x(i)))−(1−y(i))log(1−hθ(x(i)))]
(6)
where m is the number of samples in the training dataset and
x is a matrix consisting of m feature vectors of the training
samples. We use gradient descent method to find the minimum
of the cost function and the corresponding values in θ.
B. Classification Threshold
The value of hθ should be carefully determined. We shuffled
the 4998 labeled samples and took 3500 of them as training
set and the remaining 1498 as test set. Note that the split
of the dataset is arbitrary so that we can observe a suitable
threshold value. When the θ is optimized, we then calculate
the campaign score of each Q&A session in the test dataset.
The distribution of scores for normal sessions and campaign
sessions is shown in Figure 5.
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Fig. 5. Scores of test set (CDF)
From the figure, we can see that the two types of Q&A
sessions exhibit great difference on the distribution of the
campaign scores. Most of the campaign scores are very close
to their true labels (Y = 1 or Y = 0). Using the scores, we
can either provide the raw scores to the users to help them
make decisions when reading the answers, or we can assign
the labels based on a threshold value, i.e., Y = 1 when the
6campaign score is larger than the threshold value and Y = 0
otherwise.
Fig. 6. ROC Curve of the classification result with different threshold values
In Figure 6, we show the ROC curve based on different
threshold values, 0.1, 0.2, ..., 0.9. The points on the curve
are mostly located at the top left position of the curve. The
reason is that the campaign scores of most campaign sessions
are higher than 0.9 while the campaign scores of most normal
sessions are smaller than 0.1. This curve shows that the system
performance is robust with a large range of threshold value.
Based on Figure 5 and Figure 6, we set 0.5 as our threshold
for hθ. We also tested it with other randomly shuffle as well
as with samples sorted by timestamp and we observed similar
phenomenon.
V. ADAPTIVE ONLINE DETECTION SYSTEM
In the previous section, we have shown that we can build a
model to effectively calculate the campaign score and predict
the labels of unknown sessions. In practice, however, this
offline analysis does not work well for users who would
like to be advised of potential campaigns in real time. This
requirement encourages us to design an online version of
detection system, which can return campaign scores and/or
predicted results in real time. We therefore build a prototype of
such an adaptive online detection system. The word “adaptive”
implies that this system can update its database using new
samples and generate new model parameters.
A. Overview of System Design
The major components of the detection system include
browser plugin and a remote server. Figure 7 shows the system
architecture and the communication between the client plugin
and the server.
As shown in Figure 7, the sequence of actions that take
place when a user opens a Q/A session are:
1) The plugin first sends only the URL of the page to the
server. The server searches for the url in its database. If
it is found, the server returns the score (spam rating) to
the client. The client side script displays the result. This
avoids unnecessarily sending complete web page to the
server if it is already present in the database.
2) If the URL is not present, the server sends a response
not found and the client after receiving the response
sends the rest of the data to the server through another
XMLHTTPRequest and waits for the server’s response.
3) The server receives the data, segments the text into
words, and stores it in the database. The server then
extracts the statistical features necessary for the analysis
from the data. Logistic regression analysis is performed
to predict the class of the session (spam or no spam). If
the session is classified as a spam, an alert is returned
back to the user.
4) The client-side script displays the result to the user.
5) (Optional) If the user is an authorized user, the user
can provide feedback to the server (whether or not
he/she feels the session is a campaign session). There
are three types of users in the system: regular users are
those who use our system and they are not granted the
right to annotate sessions; helper users are those who
have experience and are capable of helping label the
data; the administrator is the person responsible for the
management of the system.
6) When newly labelled sessions are available, the system
updates the detection model using existing and newly
labelled data. Note that this step could be done regularly
in a daily or even weekly basis.
B. Plugin Design
The plugin is a Google Chrome extension. It must be
installed on the Chrome browser in the user’s system. The
plugin consists of manifest.json file, a HTML file and a
contentscript.js file. The contentscript.js file specifies the
javascript to be executed on the webpage the user is brows-
ing. The manifest.json file contains information regarding the
name, version of plugin and the HTML, script files associated
with the plugin. The manifest file also contains a list of
permissions that the plugin might use to access servers. The
functions of the plugin can be separated into three major steps.
1) Extract data from the webpage. All the data required
from the webpage are extracted from the HTML source
of the webpage. Separate javascript functions were writ-
ten for extracting various information. The information
extracted includes the page URL, Question, Questioner
Name, Questioner URL, Time of posting question, Ques-
tion Category, Best Answer, Answerer Name, Answerer
URL, Time of posting answer, and Rating of the answer.
All the functions are written in the contentscript.js file.
2) Send data to the server. The server processes the data
and returns the result. The client-side Javascript commu-
nicates with the server by sending a XMLHTTPRequest.
The POST method is used to send the request because
the data to be sent may be big for using the GET method.
Also for data extracted from the zhidao.baidu.com web-
site the encoding of the data is set to gb2312 in order
to encode Chinese characters.
3) The result is displayed to the user. If the user is an
authorized user, the user can enter his/her feedback to
7Fig. 7. System architecture and communication between the client and the server
the server.
C. Server Design
The server communicates with the plugin and also maintains
a database system. The database system stores the information
of Q&A sessions and the prediction model. The server receives
the Q&A session data sent from the browser plugin. If the
database has the label for the session, the server returns
the label. If it is a new session, the server stores it in a
buffer, calculates the spam grade based on the current model
parameters, and returns the spam grade if necessary (i.e., a
campaign session is detected). When enough data has been
collected, we can use the helpers to label the data. Using
logistic regression, the detection model will be updated using
previous data as well as the newly labelled data.
D. Evaluation of Adaptive Online Detection System
To evaluate the performance of adaptive online detection
system, we use the collected data from Baidu Zhidao and
replay the data in multiple iterations to simulate a real-world
scenario. In particular, we pretend that initially we only have
partial data and use the data as the training dataset to build a
detection model. In each iteration, we add some new sessions
and use them as the test dataset to test the performance of the
detection system. At the end of an iteration, the new sessions
are added into the training dataset, and the detection model is
updated using the new training dataset. This step corresponds
to the scenario that new data are labeled and added into the
system. Then we repeat with another iteration. Note that we
sort the Q&A sessions according to the timestamp when a
session is closed. In this way, the performance is closer to
that of a real-world scenario.
For the test, we begin with 200-sample training set and
build an initial detection model. At each iteration, we add 200-
sample test set. After evaluating the detection performance,
we expand the training dataset with the 200 test samples,
and update the detection model with the new training dataset.
We repeat this process until we use up all 4998 samples. We
evaluate the following four performance metrics:
Precision =
TruePositive
TruePositive+ FalsePositive
Recall =
TruePositive
TruePositive+ FalseNegative
F −measure = 2 ∗ Precision ∗Recall
Precision+Recall
Accuracy =
TrueNegative+ TruePositive
TotalNumberofUsers
Figure 8 and Figure 9 show the update of model parameters
and the detection performance in each iteration, respectively.
In Figure 8, the four “Theta” from 1 to 4 are the parameters
for intercept term, SGqID, SGaID, and SGtext, respectively.
We can observe that the detection model tends to converge
after enough sessions have been added into the database
over several iterations. For example, after 10 iterations, the
precision achieves 85% - 90%.
We also notice that there is a “degraded” point at the 15th
iteration in the recall, f-measure and accuracy figures. After
carefully checking the log file of this iteration, we find out the
True/False Positive and True/False Negative of this iteration,
as listed in Table I. We can see that the False Negative is very
high, which means a large number of campaign sessions is
classified as the normal ones. Nonetheless, the system is able
to recover from the bad performance and works well over all
measures after more Q&A data is taken into account in training
the model. The four metrics are all above 80% during the last
few iterations. This test scenario is similar to the practical
application where we predicate the unknown sessions using
current knowledge and train a new model based on the sessions
after we manually label them.
8TP FP TN FN
92% 6% 31% 71%
TABLE I: Test results of the 15th iteration
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Fig. 8. Adaptive changes of model parameters over time
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Fig. 9. The performance of the online detection system over time
To illustrate the advantage of adaptiveness, we also perform
another test in which we fix the model after it is trained on the
initial dataset. We use 200 samples as the initial training data
and build a model. We fix the model parameters, and at each
iteration, we test 200 new sessions using the fixed model. The
results are shown in Figure 10.
Since the parameters of the fixed model is only trained on
the first set of training samples, we omit the figure for the
system parameters. The precision in some tests is nearly 50%
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Fig. 10. The performance of the fixed model
and it even becomes very high in a few tests from the 15th to
the 20th iterations. However, compared to Figure 9, we note
that the recall values are always very low. It means that the
false negative is high. The low f-measure values confirm this
problem in the fixed model. It means that the non-adaptive
model classifies many campaign Q&A sessions as the non-
campaign sessions. Consequently, although the precision is
high, other metrics indicate that the non-adaptive model has
obvious bias in classification. What’s worse, this model cannot
update itself by new samples because the parameters are only
trained on the initial training dataset. Therefore, making the
predication model adaptive is critical for accurate predication
in practice.
VI. RELATED WORK
Our research is mostly related to work on spam detection
and recognizing experts or authoritative users and trustworthy
content in the social media. We discuss prior work on two
aspects.
A. Retrieving High-Quality Answers in CQA Sites
Jeon et al. [5] attempted to predict the quality of answers
in a community based question answering service with only
non-textual features, such as Answerer’s Acceptance Ration,
Answer Length and User’s Recommendation. They assumed
the user feedback was a reliable source for the evaluation.
Jurczyk et al. [6] presented a study of link structure of
Yahoo! Answers. They adopted an adaptation of the HITS
algorithm [18] for finding experts in the Q&A portal. Their
research was based on the assumption that the user feedback
could be used to assign weights on the edges of their graph
representing user relationships.
Liu et al. [9] applied their automated summary technique to
summarize answers for questions which ask for opinions. Bian
et al. [10] tried to use both relevance between questions and
9answers and the quality of answers to retrieve good answers
for a user query. Later, in another work by Bian et al. [16],
they considered the effect of vote spam attacks. Such activities
involved malicious voting for specific answers to improve their
ranking and to decrease the ranking of competitors at the
same time. Agichtein et al. [7] studied the basic elements
of social media and combined three features of the social
media to facilitate the task of identifying high quality content,
namely intrinsic content quality, interactions between users
and content usage statistics.
Fichman [19] conducted a comparative study of answer
quality on multiple Q&A websites. Accuracy, completeness
and verifiability were used as the quality measures for cross
platform comparison. Fichman found that the quality of an-
swers was significantly improved only in terms of answer
completeness and verifiability, not the answer accuracy.
B. Work on Crowd-Sourcing Spams in Different Realms
Previous research has also investigated the crowd-sourcing
spam in other areas. Jindal et al. [20], Ott et al. [21] and
Arjun et al. [15] attempted to detect fake review or opinion
spam in the online shopping stores, like Amazon’s online store.
Similar to research in CQA websites, they also used textual
similarity features and user-oriented features, like ratings and
history records. Huang et al. [22] developed a regression
model with features suggesting quality-biased short text in
Microblogging service, Twitter. They judged the quality of
tweets based on relevance, informativeness, readability, and
politeness of the short content and assigned different scores
from 1 to 5. However, they didn’t explicitly present how they
define a spam-like tweet. Huang et al. [23] conducted a similar
study of commercial spam on blogging sites. They showed
that the propaganda of some products in the comment of a
blog post was crucial in detecting the malicious comments.
The propaganda appeared in the form of URL, phone number,
E-mail address, MSN numbers etc.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Detection of hidden campaigns can improve the user’s ex-
perience when using current social websites. In this paper, we
disclose the behavior of a specific group of online paid posters
who create commercial campaigns on the community Q&A
websites. We collect real-world datasets and identify effective
features to distinguish normal sessions and the campaigns.
The performance of our classifier, with integrated statistic
and semantic analysis, is quite promising on the real-world
case study. Based on a learning technique, we also implement
a prototype of adaptive online detection system which can
retrieve the result in real time. The campaign scores and/or
predicated labels can help users make better decisions when
searching for answers on CQA portals and help the questioners
select better answers as well.
This work is our first effort to detect online paid posters
of CQA websites. In the future, we will test more features to
improve the adaptive performance.
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